I. INTRODUCTION
The reaction to the Vietnam War protest years, the presidency of Richard Nixon, and ultimately that of Ronald Reagan, ushered in a conservative revolution in the United States that still endures. Republican Presidents during this period have appointed eleven Justices to the United States Supreme Court, 1 seven of whom serve on the Court today.
2
Coinciding with this historical phenomenon was the proliferation of drug usage in the country: first marijuana, hallucinogenic drugs, and amphetamines during the counterculture years of the late '60s and '70s, and later powder and then crack cocaine. When prosecutorial emphasis shifted, especially at the federal level, 3 to meet the increased fascination with narcotics, courts in the country became deluged with drug cases, many if not most of which presented Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues. This, of course, was because the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule could make the corpus of the crime unavailable to the prosecution.
Burger and Rehnquist, the Court took the opportunity to rule in favor of the government most of the time, lending its imprimatur to the particular search and seizure practice employed and, in doing so, slanted the Constitution toward validating police practices and away from individual privacy-what I have called the "blueing" (for police blue) of America. Not only was the warrant requirement relaxed, 5 but also expectations of privacy were drastically narrowed, 6 and the police were granted virtually open season on vehicle searches. 7 The definition of probable cause was diluted, 8 and the standards on what constituted a law enforcement search 9 or seizure 10 were drawn narrowly.
During this time, the Court also has been relaxing the rules on interrogation surrounding Miranda v. Arizona.
11
Interrogation is largely superfluous in drug cases because the possession of drugs makes interrogation unnecessary, and, conversely, because suppression of illegally seized narcotics makes any admission irrelevant (due either to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine or lack of the corpus of the crime). Nevertheless, the parallel between the Supreme Court's Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is squarely indicative of the bent to the law enforcement side of the ledger; a swing to the crime control model. equality, and limitation on official power. 14 By the end of the 1960s, the Warren Court was in the final stages of fostering the "Due Process Model" by constitutionalizing criminal procedure. This was accomplished both by giving content to the general provisions in the Bill of Rights dealing with criminal procedure, and by completing the process of selectively applying the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, all designed to protect the individual rights of criminal defendants. It is possible to view the Burger and later Rehnquist Courts as reacting to the individual and civil rights focus of the Warren years, a correction if you wish. Nonetheless, there has been a drastic swing on the Court toward the "Crime Control Model." Considerable privacy interests and civil liberties were sacrificed to law enforcement during the last three decades of the twentieth century in the name of the war on drugs.
To grasp the point, it only needs to be realized that the Supreme Court has held that there is no expectation of privacy in personal bank records, 15 or one's wiretaps, 23 surveillance of computer communication, 24 application of streamlined foreign intelligence surveillance procedures to domestic criminal investigations, 25 and perusal of library and book records. 26 Still worse, we are utilizing torture to interrogate detainees, which is apparently authorized at the highest levels of the U.S government.
27
As the country has meandered to the right politically in the past thirty to thirty-five years, a steady deterioration of privacy protection and civil liberties has developed. First, methodically and largely unnoticed in the name of the War on Drugs, and now more rapidly and apparent in the War on Terrorism, our free, open society is casually losing its grip. It is, of course, no answer to say that this was demanded by the terrorist threat since much of it occurred prior to the events of September 11, 2001, through creeping constitutional lawmaking involving purely domestic law enforcement. Nor is it an answer to argue that the more recent incarnation of the threat to civil liberties is merely directed at investigations of terrorists. The PATRIOT Act has now been reauthorized, circumventing its original sunset provisions, and to assume that the tools provided by this statute will not be applied in investigations of domestic crime is, at best, wishful thinking. 2. The informant's basis of knowledge was not provided, but the Court held that probable cause was established because officers verified the detailed description of Draper, and information th at he wou ld return to D enver from Chicago on on e of tw o days, tha t he wo uld be wearing a light-colored raincoat, brown slacks, and black shoes, and would be walking "real fast." Id.
II. THE WAR ON DRUGS
I have no intention of re-analyzing all of the Fourth Amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court which have limited the protection of that provision. That has already been done by many, 28 including me.
29
The decisions are many and profound, and they have virtually all come in drug cases. To provide a flavor for the restrictions on personal privacy, however, I do want to survey a few of the decisional areas favoring law enforcement search and seizure practices to illustrate the threat to civil liberties antedating the advent of the War on Terror. I do this principally to emphasize that the currently perceived assault on our personal freedoms began thirty years ago in the War on Drugs and only recently has been exacerbated by the slide into the fight against terrorism. 30 and lasting for nearly twenty-five years, the United States Supreme Court developed a precise set of rules for a magistrate to follow to measure whether information provided by a government informant established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. These rules required that the affidavit provide information indicating:
A. Probable Cause, the Good Faith Exception, and the Deterrent Effect of the Exclusionary Rule

Beginning in 1959 in Draper v. United States
(1) the informant's basis of knowledge, i.e., how the information about the criminal activity was acquired, and (2) the informant's veracity or why the information was likely reliable. 31 Fairly viewed, if either of these requirements
were not met, they could be supplanted by the informant providing sufficient detail about the criminal activity which could be corroborated by law enforcement officials.
32
The Court rejected a "totality of circumstances" approach in favor of a more precise analysis to ensure both the actual existence This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condom iniums. M ost of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys [sic] down and drives it back. Sue flys [sic] back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $ 100,000 .00 in drugs. Presently they have over $ 1 00,000 .00 worth of drugs in their basem ent.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on pushers. I guarantee if you watch them carefully you w ill make a big catch. They are friends with some big drug[] dealers, who visit their house often.
of an informant and to provide standards for magistrates to apply in making the probable cause determination. 33 In 1983 in Illinois v. Gates, after nearly a quarter of a century with these guidelines, the Supreme Court per then Justice Rehnquist threw them out in favor of the same totality of circumstances test the Court earlier had rejected consistently. 34 Although magistrates had been applying the standards for years, the majority concluded that they were too complicated and confusing and that, in applying the totality approach,
[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
35
Justice Rehnquist then said, "And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for . . . conclud [ing] ' that probable cause existed." 36 In other words, by the time the probable cause determination is reviewed in a motion to suppress or on appeal, the standard is whether there was a substantial basis for a fair probability that evidence of crime would be found.
37
This accomplishes at least two things, both reducing Fourth Amendment protections in favor of law enforcement. First, and more specifically, the new standard allowed probable cause to be established from anonymous tips, like the one provided in the Gates case itself. knowledge and veracity requirements, the latter could never be satisfied directly because the identity of the informant is inherently unknown. Second, and more generally, the totality standard articulated in Gates is so vague and flexible, and the standard of review so deferential, that it seems virtually impossible to challenge the finding of probable cause, unless there is a bare bones affidavit 39 in a warrant application (which could only be a result of poor police work). Although Gates involved a search warrant, there is nothing in the opinion that limits the standard for probable cause to warrant cases, exacerbating the problem by permitting embellishment and hindsight judgment in non-warrant cases.
A year later in United States v. Leon, 40 the Supreme Court adopted in warrant cases the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, primarily based on the Court's exclusive focus on the rule's deterrent effect on law enforcement. 41 The good faith exception not only independently undermines
Fourth Amendment standards for warrants, but also when combined with the loose definition of probable cause from Gates, it makes the probable cause basis for a warrant virtually immune from challenge. In fact, the malleable definition of probable cause from Gates actually makes that decision a kind of good faith standard even in the case of warrantless searches. The exclusive focus on the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule-as opposed to the interest in judicial integrity-has been relied upon by the Court in a number of cases to restrict the operation of the rule. In United States v. Calandra, a majority of the Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand jury proceedings.
42
Two years later, a majority held the rule inapplicable to a civil tax enforcement proceeding 43 the Court held that the rule also would not apply in a civil deportation hearing 45 and parole revocation proceedings.
46
In all of these cases, the principal foundation for the position of the majority was that to the extent the exclusionary rule deters officers from violating the Fourth Amendment, the focus of the law enforcement mindset is on the introduction of evidence at the criminal trial and on appeal; tangential proceedings are not seriously considered by law enforcement officials in the deterrent equation. This, of course, ignores both the incremental deterrent effect that application of the rule to all proceedings would have and the interest in judicial integrity-the notion that governmental processes which impose severe disabilities on individuals should not benefit from their own violation of the law.
47
Taken together, focusing only on the deterrent impact of the exclusion of evidence, diluting the standard for probable cause, and creating the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule provides a clear guide to where the Court was headed with Fourth Amendment law during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The War on Drugs was being fought at the expense of personal freedoms. The effect was subtle, but substantial when viewed in the conglomerate, as the next sections will show.
B. The Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
In 1967, in Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Stewart changed the focus of the Fourth Amendment from a property-and-trespass rationale (whether there was an intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area") to instead view it through a privacy lens. 48 In Katz, no trespass into a protected property interest had taken place because government agents had placed the electronic bug involved on the outside of a public telephone booth. 49 The change from the narrower property to a broader privacy rationale signaled an expansion of Fourth Amendment protection. Just four years later, United States v. White 50 was a harbinger that it was not to be.
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51. See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1970) (rejecting the argument that the wired informant was a trespasser because consent to entry was based on fraud); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (holding that the federal agent's entry into defendant's residence by adopting the guise of "Jimmy the P ollack" w as not a trespass); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that the risk of being overheard or betrayed is an inherent condition of human society and thus the kind of risk people assume whenever they speak); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (holding that the petitioner assumed the risk that his bribe offer to another would be accurately reproduced in court, "whether by faultless memory or m echanical recording").
52. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring White was a classic wired informant case of the kind the Court formerly had permitted under the no trespass and assumption of the risk rationales.
51
Katz, however, had clearly undermined the lack of trespass justification for the earlier decisions, and the assumption of the risk theory was also on shaky ground under the Katz expectation of privacy analysis. Justice White's plurality opinion was able to finesse the problem by utilizing Justice Harlan's concurring opinion from Katz itself. In Katz, Justice Harlan wrote that not only must a suspect have a subjective expectation of privacy-something that the defendant White surely had in his private conversation with the informant-but also it had to be an expectation that society was prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable. 52 Justice White argued in the White case:
Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular situations may be or the extent to which they may have in fact relied on the discretion of their companions. Very probably, individual defendants neither know nor suspect that their colleagues have gone or will go to the police or are carrying recorders or transmitters. Otherwise, conversation would cease and our problem with these encounters would be nonexistent or far different from those now before us. Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally "justifiable"-what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant.
53
Thus the ground had been laid for a narrow view of privacy expectations. To be recognized, an expectation of privacy had to be "constitutionally 'justifiable'" or what was to become in later cases a "legitimate expectation of privacy," as recognized not necessarily by society, but by the Court as its proxy. 54 This decision, of course, opened the use of drug-sniffing dogs to every place from airports to automobiles to schools; the only thing left protected was the home. Any other item arguably in public was vulnerable to the drug dog; no suspicion was required because it was not a search. This "no search" casualty to privacy in the War on Drugs has tremendous potential for application to video surveillance and new surveillance devices such as weapons detectors, and facial and vehicle character recognition technology.
A doctrinal development equally threatening to personal privacy is the Court's "no seizure" theory. This concept developed from cases involving the so-called "drug courier profile," a set of otherwise innocent behavior patterns which, when taken together, allegedly give the well-trained law enforcement officer suspicion to stop a person for further investigation. 74 While grappling with the issue of whether the factors in the profile provided the necessary reasonable suspicion for a Terry-type stop, the Court eventually came up with its "no seizure" rationale. 75 This is the notion that no Fourth Amendment seizure takes place when an officer confronts an individual, asks questions, asks for identification, and even for permission to search, unless a reasonable person would feel that they were not free to leave. 76 This rule is largely a non sequitur; very few persons stopped and questioned by law enforcement personnel with badges and guns would believe they were free to leave. It was, nonetheless, a way for the Court to circumvent the reasonable suspicion requirement, because if there is no seizure, then no suspicion is required. This permissive encounter rule was later moved from the air terminal and the workplace to investigative procedures on buses, where officers with insignia and visible weapons would board buses during scheduled stops and, without articulable suspicion, ask particular passengers for their identification and ticket and permission to search their person and luggage. 77 When confronted with the claim that a passenger in the confines of a bus in the midst of a journey would not feel free to leave, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Florida v. Bostick responded that the defendant had voluntarily placed himself in the bus independent of police conduct, and that " To reiterate, the significance of the "no seizure" rule, like the "no search" rule, is that if no seizure has occurred, no Fourth Amendment justification for the encounter is necessary. As in the airport or bus cases, it can be based on standardless suspicion or whim.
The virtual collapse of the Terry stop-and-frisk seizure regime into a noseizure/arrest dichotomy is also exemplified by the Supreme Court's holding in California v. Hodari D.
84 where the juvenile suspect dropped a small rock of crack cocaine while running from a police officer. 85 Since no probable cause or suspicion existed at the time the officer gave chase to the fleeing suspect, the issue was whether Hodari had been seized by the chase. D. Vehicles
The Automobile Exception
Any discussion of the escalation of permissible police search and seizure practices, and the concomitant loss of civil liberties, would be woefully incomplete without a reference to vehicles (and the drugs found inside them). Although an automobile exception to the warrant requirement-a search of a vehicle supported by probable cause does not require a warrant-has been around a long time, 91 it has expanded with a vengeance during the War on Drugs.
92
Originally based on the concept of exigent circumstances (the inherent mobility of an automobile), the lack of the need for a warrant rather easily slid into the Court's privacy analysis. 93 The need to change theories was caused by the fact that in many cases the car was going nowhere; it had been completely immobilized by the police, often by impoundment, 101. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (holding that the search of luggage seized from the trunk of a tax i was un law ful eve n th ough the police had probable cause to believe it contained marijuana); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that the warrantless search was un rea sonable even though the officers had probable cause to believe the footlocker, placed in the trunk of an automobile, contained marijuana).
102. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that a probable cause search of a vehic le extends to all containers found within; here, a brown paper bag found in the trunk).
103. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 577, 580.
searched. 94 Thus, the Court seized on a second justification for dispensing with the warrant requirement-the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile. 95 This reduced expectation is justified by the fact that vehicles travel in public in plain view and are pervasively regulated by the government.
96
This conclusion, that one has a diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle, itself of questionable validity based on subjective (and reasonable) privacy expectations, has not been limited. It has been applied to motor homes, 97 and has been expanded to apply to every container placed in a vehicle, 98 including luggage, regardless of the privacy interest in the item outside the vehicle, and irrespective of to whom it belongs.
99
The Court has consistently held that luggage and other repositories of personal effects are entitled to a legitimate privacy expectation, which absent exigent circumstances requires both probable cause and a warrant to search. 100 Initially, this conclusion held true regardless of whether such a closed container was placed in a vehicle. 101 However, a distinction soon developed between the situation where probable cause focused on a container placed in an automobile, and one where there was probable cause to search a vehicle which happened to house a container; a warrantless search of the container was permitted in the latter case under the vehicular exception.
102
Eventually, because this distinction created "confusion for law enforcement officers," it was abandoned in California v. Acevedo in favor of a clear rule that authorized the warrantless search of all containers in vehicles, irrespective of whether the investigation had focused on the container before it was placed in the car.
103
In Acevedo there was probable cause to believe that a package wrapped in a brown paper bag contained marijuana before it was placed in the trunk of defendant's car. 104 As pointed out by Justice Stevens's dissent, the majority created the curious paradox of providing full Fourth Amendment protection to a briefcase carried on the street (requiring both probable cause and a warrant), but once this same briefcase was placed in an automobile it lost the constitutional protection of the warrant requirement. 105 It comes as no surprise that all of the cases leading to the ultimate development of this rule involved narcotics, as do virtually all of the cases discussed herein dealing with the War on Drugs.
The most recent step in the steady progression of the automobile exception came in Wyoming v. Houghton where, in the case of a vehicle stopped for speeding, the majority permitted the search of a purse belonging to a passenger despite the absence of probable cause.
106 Probable cause to search focused on the driver, who had admitted that a syringe visible in his shirt pocket was used to take drugs. 107 Much earlier, in Rakas v. Illinois, the Court had reached the puzzling conclusion that a passenger in an automobile has no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle itself because the passenger has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. 108 This holding alone is probably inconsistent with everyday notions of privacy. Houghton, however, went further. Unlike Rakas, Houghton did not involve a search of compartments in the vehicle, but extended the permissive warrantless search to the passenger's effects themselves. 109 The majority again relied on the diminished expectation of privacy theory; this time for items placed in vehicles, and also opined that the passenger might be in cahoots with the driver. 110 Houghton again involved drugs. 
Search Incident to Vehicular Arrest
It comes as no surprise that the Court has taken a very expansive view of a search incident to a vehicular arrest. In Chimel v. California, the Court had limited the scope of a search incident to arrest to the function it was designed to serve-preventing the use of weapons and the destruction of evidence Just what that area covered in the case of an arrest in an automobile was, of course, unclear. Predictably, in Belton v. New York the Supreme Court took the broadest possible interpretation of the Chimel rule as it applied to vehicles, authorizing an incident-to-arrest search of the entire interior of the vehicle (excluding the trunk), including any containers found inside.
114 This rule applied even though the occupants had been removed from the vehicle and were no longer a realistic threat to reach anything therein.
115
Such a result, rejecting Chimel's functional analysis, was based on the rationalization of a need for a clear, bright-line rule to guide law enforcement. 116 The real reason was the War on Drugs.
Just recently, in Thornton v. United States, the Court extended the Belton rule to the situation where the first contact with the suspect occurred after the suspect was outside the vehicle. 117 Although the officer had probable cause to believe that Thornton had committed a traffic violation, the officer approached him on foot after he had parked and exited the vehicle.
118
Rejecting the approach applied by some jurisdictions that the Belton rule applied only where police contact was initiated while the arrestee was an occupant of the vehicle, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion again concluded that a bright-line rule was needed, and that Belton applied as long as the arrestee was a recent occupant. 119 He concluded that although the arrestee's status as a "recent occupant" might turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of arrest, it did not depend on whether he was inside or outside the car at the time of first contact. 120 In other words, the Belton search-incident-to-avehicular-arrest rule would apply as long as the arrestee had some relationship to a vehicle at the time of arrest. A gun rather than drugs was found in Thornton's car, but the justification for the search was an arrest for possession of marijuana, 121 and the officer was no doubt looking for more drugs in the car. 127. Inventories themselves are comm only of such low administrative quality that they may not be adequately protective of the owner's property or the police from false claims, thus further undermining the Court's justification for allowing them with alm ost no Fourth Amendm ent concern. For example, in Bertine, the police's inventory (described by the trial court as "slipshod"-a description dis senting Justice M ars hall called "the height of understatement") failed to list the following contents of the vehicle: $150 cash in the defendant's wallet, $210 cash in an envelope marked "rent," the defendant's credit cards, a converter, a hydraulic jack and a set of tire chains. Id. at 383 (Marshall, J., dissenting). An additional $700 cash that
The message of cases like California v. Acevedo, Belton, and Thornton is that if a container comes in contact with a vehicle or a person who is arrested recently has exited a vehicle, then the container or vehicle can be searched without a warrant. 122 The automobile has become a constitutional lightning rod in the drug war.
Inventory Searches
There is one situation where an automobile can be searched without probable cause or even suspicion. When the police take custody of a vehicle-impound it-because the driver has been arrested 123 or the vehicle has been disabled or illegally left on the street, it and all containers found inside can be "inventoried." 124 In a series of cases culminating in Colorado v.
Bertine, 125 the Supreme Court concluded that this practice was justified to protect the owner's property and to protect the police from harm and false property claims.
126
Such a rationale would be more plausible in the case of valuable or dangerous items visible in the vehicle. It becomes more questionable when closed containers (e.g., backpacks, suitcases, purses) or locked trunks are opened. Where the owner is present, a call to a relative or friend to pick up the vehicle would answer all of the court's concerns, and certainly a locked car in the police impound area would be sufficient to protect the owner's property. The concerns about successful false property claims or a bomb in the car to justify a full inventory of a vehicle and all its contents are hardly persuasive. Since the primary justification for an inventory, protection of the owner's property, adequately can be met by other alternatives, 127 custody, subjected to booking procedures including having her "mug shot" taken, and detained for about an hour before being released on bond. 143 The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, rejected both her breach-of-the-peace for custodial arrest argument as not dictated by the common law and inconsistent with longstanding state and federal practice, and her argument that a custodial arrest should be forbidden when a conviction for the offense carried no jail time or there was no other compelling reason for detention. 144 As to the latter, Justice Souter rejected the jailable versus fine-only distinction as impracticable for the police to implement given complex penalty schemes and the variety of factual conditions which might lead to differences in sentencing. Justice O'Connor, for the four dissenters, responded:
Under today's holding, when a police officer has probable cause to believe that a fineonly misdemeanor offense has occurred, that officer may stop the suspect, issue a citation, and let the person continue on her way. Or, if a traffic violation, the officer may stop the car, arrest the driver, search the driver, search the entire passenger compartment of the car including any purse or package inside, and impound the car and inventory all of its contents. Although the Fourth Amendment expressly requires that the latter course be a reasonable and proportional response to the circumstances of the offense, the majority gives officers unfettered discretion to choose that course without articulating a single reason why such action is appropriate.
146
She goes on to point out the "grave potential for abuse," either in the form of racial profiling or otherwise using a traffic stop as a pretext for further investigation, 147 a practice sanctioned by Whren v. United States.
148
In Whren, the Court had earlier held that subjective motivations for a traffic stop are irrelevant as long as probable cause exists for the detention.
149
The petitioners had argued that compliance with the multitude of traffic laws is virtually impossible and that police will invariably be able to stop a motorist for a technical violation as a springboard for further investigation. Although recognizing that "students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally," he emphasized that student athletes have even lesser privacy expectations by subjecting themselves to a degree of regulation beyond that imposed on other students. 159 He also relied on the findings below that there was a crisis of student unrest fueled by alcohol and drug abuse for which athletes' drug use served as a role model. 160 Finally, his opinion pointed to the particular danger to athletes of drug usage. 161 After relying on these specific factors, Justice Scalia "caution[ed] against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts."
162
This caution was short-lived. Seven years later in the Earls decision, a majority of the Court upheld a suspicionless, random, drug-testing program applicable to middle and high school students who participated in any extracurricular activity. Justice Thomas's majority opinion de-emphasized the focus in Acton on student-athletes, stating that factor "was not essential to our decision," 163 and concluded that all students who participate in any extracurricular activity "voluntarily subject themselves" regulations resulting in reduced expectations of privacy. Thomas also substantially expanded the governmental concern regarding the particular drug problem at the school in Acton relied on by Justice Scalia, arguing that it suffices that "the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school."
165
Justice Thomas also found that the method of collecting the samples and the limited uses to which they were put were "minimally intrusive," and thus "the invasion of the student's privacy is not significant." 166 The majority opinion concluded by finding that "testing students who participate in extracurricular activities is a reasonably effective means of addressing the School District's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use."
167
The Supreme Court has thus moved from the rather narrow constitutional authorization of suspicionless drug testing in Skinner and Von Raab through the expansion in Acton to virtually complete permissiveness in Earls, at least in the public school context. Again, in the name of the War on Drugs, which Justice Thomas's majority opinion in Earls specifically mentions, the Court has permitted governmental intrusion into privacy without any individualized justification whatsoever. Even viewed in isolation, this cannot be described fairly as minor (at least for the students and parents subjected to these policies), but when added to the other previously discussed, Court-sanctioned, police and government practices limiting privacy rights, a substantial intrusion of civil liberties has taken place well before 9/11. overtones. His majority opinion began by applying the now familiar analysis of balancing the advantages of applying the exclusionary rule to a particular constitutional violation against its social costs. Justice Scalia first concluded that violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule was not even a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence. "Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house." 188 He next reached the questionable conclusion that the interests served by the rule-preventing violence and the destruction of property, and protecting the occupant's dignity-would not be served directly by the exclusion of the evidence obtained. When turning to the "social costs" side of the ledger, in addition to the loss of evidence and criminal convictions, Justice Scalia suggested a flood of litigation over alleged failures to observe the rule or the justification for an unannounced entry, together with discouraging police from making timely entry after knocking and announcing. Although the analysis at this point was enough to sustain avoidance of the exclusionary rule, Justice Scalia returned to the advantages of the exclusion side of the balance to consider deterrence of the police. Here is where the opinion gets ominous for the future of the exclusionary rule generally because Scalia's remarks apply well beyond violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule. He hints that the exclusion of evidence may no longer be necessary because things have changed since the days of Mapp v. Ohio, suggesting that civil suits and accompanying attorney's fees, along with increasing professionalism and a new emphasis on internal police discipline, may be adequate remedies to deter police misbehavior.
F. A Brief Hesitation
189
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion provided the necessary fifth vote for Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court. 190 He stated, "[T]he continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt. Today's decision determines only that in the specific context of the knock-and-announce requirement, a violation is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of evidence to justify suppression."
191 Nevertheless, he joined all but the last part of Justice Scalia's opinion (which described the application of three earlier cases to his analysis, and was not directly related to his deterrence discussion). Although the dissent focused on the knock-andannounce analysis and not the portentous consequences of the majority (1) the term "m aterial support or resources" means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipm ent, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more ind ivid uals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials; opinion, the new Roberts Court may be beginning to flex its muscles. The War on Drugs (and civil liberties) may be fought in this venue with a vengeance.
III. THE WAR ON TERRORISM
My goal here in describing government action in the name of security that substantially impacts civil liberties, both before and primarily after 9/11, is not to cover these laws in detail. Others have done that. My interest instead is to briefly describe these national security measures to portray how, on the heels of and in conjunction with the War on Drugs, they have further undermined liberty and privacy interests. It is the overall impact, the cumulative effect, of these wars (on drugs and terrorism) over the past thirty years with which we should be concerned.
A. Pre-9/11: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
In the wake of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which encompassed two innovative federal crimes. 192 (2) the term "training" means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge; and (3) the term "expert advice or assistance" means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. (4) the term "m aterial support or resources" has the same meaning given that term in section 2339A (including the definitions of "training" and "expert advice or assistance" in that section); . . . (6) the term "terrorist organization" means an organization designated as a terrorist organization und er section 2 19 of the Im migration and Nationality Act.
195. Sections 233 9A and B create substantive liability unlike the secondary liability created by conspiracy and complicity law for the substantive offenses comm itted by the conspiracy or principal actors with whom one is an accomplice. T he practical result is that a person can be charged with both a violation of these aiding-terrorism offenses and possibly also substantive offenses committed by those aided.
196. Section 233 9B requ ires the m ental state of acting "knowingly," § 2339B(a)(1), whereas § 2339A covers the provision of material support or resources "knowing or intending" that they be used in an act of terrorism, § 2339A(a) (em phasis added).
197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (MPC) is fairly representative of the difference. Under the M PC , a person acts "purposely" when it is "his conscious object to engage in conduct . . . or cause a result," § 2.02(2)(a) (emphasis added), whereas acting "knowin gly" requires awareness of the nature of the conduct or aw areness th at it is "practically certain that his conduct will cause . . . [the] result," § 2.02(2)(b) (emphasis added). Under the MPC, knowledge is also established "if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence," § 2.02(7). any independent criminal act as in the case of complicity, 199 the reach of the federal criminal arm is substantial. For example, anyone who engages in a financial transaction with or provides supplies to a person or group planning an act covered by § 2339A is potentially subject to arrest and prosecution. Dealing with or providing materials to a designated "terrorist organization" under § 2339B is likewise vulnerable to prosecution. Obviously, there are cases deserving of prosecution here, 200 but there is also cause for concern for the same reasons that the law of conspiracy and complicity has generally rejected broad aiding-with-knowledge responsibility.
201
Section 2339B, on its face, suffers from due process infirmities. As mentioned above, this section makes it a federal crime to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). This statute does not define such an entity, but instead states that a terrorist organization is "an organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act." 202 This latter provision gives the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General, the authority to designate a group as a foreign terrorist organization if the group is foreign, engages or has the intent to engage in terrorist activity, and threatens the national security of the United States.
203
The statute does not require that an organization be given notice of the designation process, and the group is not provided any opportunity to present information challenging the designation before it is made. 204 Although the 
v. Department of State
209 that the lack of notice and absence of an opportunity to be heard prior to the designation violated due process for organizations who had a presence in the United States. The PMOI holding, however, specifically did not apply to organizations without a U.S. presence, 210 and, more importantly, these decisions have nothing to say about the ability of a defendant charged with violating § 2339B to challenge the designation process in the criminal prosecution. Section 2339B does not make it a crime to provide support or resources to a terrorist organization unless the group has been so designated by the Secretary of State. 211 The two district courts that have decided on the criminal defendant's ability to challenge the designation have reached conflicting results, 212 leaving defendants charged with violating the already vague perimeters of § 2339B without any clear recourse to challenge the prosecution on this ground.
213
Another interesting aspect of both § 2339A and § 2339B is how the government has interpreted and used the statutory term "material support or resources," defined in § 2339A(b). Although a number of prosecutions using various aspects of this definition have occurred post-9/11, 214 the government also has taken the expansive position that the term "personnel" in the definition includes providing oneself. In fact, the United States Attorneys' Manual provides:
[t]here are two different ways of providing "personnel" to a designated foreign terrorist recruiting another to work under its direction or control. The statute encompasses both methods, so long as the requisite direction or control is present.
215
The government has had success with this theory in two cases since 9/11. 216 the personnel provision unconstitutionally vague as applied. Particularly troubling to the judge was that it would be difficult for a lawyer representing a leader of a foreign terrorist organization to avoid criminal prosecution even under the government's theory that "personnel" applies only to "employees" or "quasi-employees." 220 But irrespective of Sattar I, and the court's concern for attorney liability under the government's expansive "personnel" theory, at least in some cases, the government can allege that the personnel provided is the defendant himself. Taken together, these factors (requiring only the mens rea of knowledge, the inability of some organizations and all criminal defendants to challenge the designation of a group as a foreign terrorist organization, and the broad use by the government of the term "personnel" to cover the defendant himself) raise serious potential for infringement of First Amendment expression and associational rights. The Lynne Stewart case, with its surrounding publicity, may prove to be a warning.
B. The USA PATRIOT Act
Although the United States has a history of reactionary and repressive behavior in a crisis, 221 the USA PATRIOT Act ("Unifying and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism") may prove to be the broadest, wholesale threat to civil liberties in the nation's history. Passed just six weeks after the September 11 attacks, without congressional hearings and floor debate, 222 the voluminous piece of legislation grants to law enforcement many coveted, but previously rejected, powers. 223 Since most of its provisions amend and modify existing laws, it is a bill that cannot be read, but only deciphered and analyzed.
Although there are many onerous provisions in the Act, I intend to focus on the ones that most directly threaten privacy and Fourth Amendment protection, which has been my theme all along. These include sections which authorize secret search warrants, provide for roving wiretaps, expand electronic surveillance authority, permit judges to issue nationwide search warrants, and allow the seizure of various business records without probable cause or even proof of reasonable suspicion. Likewise, the definition of "terrorism" in the Act is so broad as to include many domestic crimes, including public protests. My goal here is not to urge repeal because Congress recently re-authorized the Act. 224 It is rather to emphasize how the pressure to 
Sneak-and-Peek Search Warrants
The Fourth Amendment, through its reasonableness requirement, generally requires notice of authority and purpose to search (the so-called knock-and-announce rule).
227
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by its notice and inventory provision, likewise required contemporaneous notice of the execution of a search warrant. 228 There are good reasons for this requirement. Notice allows the subject of the search to point out defects in the warrant or its execution, such as misidentification of the property or person to be searched, and it permits the target to monitor the scope of the search to ensure that it is conducted properly. Most importantly, it deters violence. The notice requirement is thus designed to minimize intrusions into dwellings or business locations, which lie at the heart of Fourth Amendment privacy protection.
229
For the first time in the nation's history, Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act provides express statutory authorization for the issuance of surreptitious search warrants (so-called sneak-and-peek or covert-entry warrants).
230 This type of warrant permits officers to enter a home or dwelling without notice, look around, take pictures, examine electronic files, and leave without With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court order under this section, or any other rule of law, to search for and seize any property or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States, any notice required, or that may be required, to be given may be delayed if-(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing imm ediate notification of the execution of the warrant m ay have an adverse result (as defined in section 2705) . . . . ; (2) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible property, any wire or electronic comm unication (as defined in section 2510), or, except as expressly provided in chapter 121, any stored wire or electronic information, except where the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure; and (3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice within a reasonable period of its execution, which period may thereafter be extended by the court for good cause shown.
Id.
232. contemporaneous notification to the target that a search has taken place. A sneak-and-peek warrant is usually a precursor to the issuance of a conventional search warrant where property is subsequently seized. Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act amends 18 U.S.C. § 3103a by adding subsection (b) permitting "Delay" under certain circumstances. 231 The statute authorizes delay when "the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result." 232 The definition of "adverse result," taken from 18 U.S.C. § 2705, which deals with delaying notice for searching e-mail or other stored electronic communications, includes "endangering the life or physical safety of an individual, flight from prosecution, destruction or tampering with evidence, intimidation of potential witnesses, or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial. The concern, of course, is that with the new statutory authorization, sneakand-peek warrants will become the rule rather than the exception, as envisioned by the Second and Ninth Circuits. Section 213 is not limited to terrorism, but applies to all criminal investigations, and there is no applicable sunset provision. It does not take a lot of foresight or tax the instincts to realize that law enforcement officers may prefer covert entry to look around, take photographs, and examine computer files and e-mail in order to gain support for a conventional warrant. by the Department of Justice indicated that in the eighteen months after the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the DOJ sought to delay notice to the target 248 times that a surreptitious warrant had been issued, and the Justice Department boasted that it has never been turned down by a court when requesting delayed notification of covert entry.
244
Because of the vagueness of § 213, the threat to privacy is substantial. First, 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(1)'s standard of "reasonable cause" to delay notice is not defined, and the belief in an "adverse result" requirement is much broader than the justifications under current law for dispensing with notice. Under Supreme Court precedent, notification is not necessary when there is a danger of violence, destruction of evidence, or flight.
245
To this list, the definition of adverse result borrowed from 18 U.S.C. § 2705 adds "intimidation of potential witnesses, or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation," 246 hardly a narrow or definitive standard. Moreover, the definition is taken from a statute governing delaying notice of searches of electronic communication and applies it to physical entry into the sanctity of the home. At the very least, the statute should be consistent with electronic surveillance law, which before a warrant is issued requires a showing that "other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 247 Second, the statute generally prohibits seizures without notice, but contains an exception where a court finds "reasonable necessity for the seizure," 248 which could amount to nothing more than the plain view seizure of contraband or evidence of crime discovered once covert entry is made. Although the original delay provision in § 3103a contained no time period in which notice must be given, only providing for the giving of notice "within a reasonable period of its execution," and permitting an extension "by the court for good cause shown," 249 need" is better than the former "good cause," it is still so vague as to be virtually meaningless, allowing judges to merely rubber stamp the request. The threat to privacy here is significant because the lengthy notice requirement will encourage law enforcement officials to request surreptitious warrants at the beginning of an investigation-as a crutch or bootstrap-rather than at the end, since notice can be delayed rather indefinitely while the investigation continues. A shorter notice requirement, like the seven days in the bill introduced by Senator Specter, at the very least, would force agents to postpone requests for sneak-and-peek warrants until the end of the investigation or risk premature notification before the investigation is complete. Overall, the breadth and vagueness of the new delayed-notice provision, even as amended, is inconsistent with the protection of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
Nationwide Service of Search Warrants
Supplementing, but not limited to, the sneak-and-peek authority is § 219 of the PATRIOT Act, which amends FED. R. CRIM . P. 41(b) to permit the issuance of nationwide search warrants in cases of domestic or international terrorism. 255 Likewise potentially applicable to U.S. citizens in domestic criminal investigations is the expanded roving wiretap authority which § 206 of the PATRIOT Act provides for FISA surveillance. To be sure, so-called roving wiretaps, where the surveillance follows the subject instead of being placed in an identified location, have been authorized under Title III since 1986. The initial amendment to Title III required that the target have a purpose "to thwart interception by changing [communications] facilities." 280 In 1998, the standard was changed to permit a "roving wiretap" where "there is probable cause to believe that the person's actions could have the effect of thwarting interception from a specified [communications] facility." 281 The breadth of the later amendment, designed to meet modern technology, poses a more serious threat to privacy than the fixed interceptions previously authorized.
It is true, to some extent, that the debate surrounding roving surveillance following § 206 of the PATRIOT Act should really go back twenty years or at least to 1998, 282 "a significant purpose" of the investigation need be gathering foreign intelligence information. 285 And, as shown above, U.S. citizens can be subject to the newly authorized roving surveillance under the weaker standards of FISA. Finally, it should be noted that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's orders are granted and enforced in secret, and thus are not public or known to the target. 286 Section 208 of the PATRIOT Act expands the number of judges on the secret court from seven to eleven. 287 Although not a direct threat of additional domestic surveillance, it does increase the number of judges available to issue intercept orders.
288
This discussion, of course, is overshadowed by the recent disclosure that the administration has been engaged in secret domestic surveillance. In December 2005, the New York Times reported, and the White House later confirmed, that President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to secretly electronically eavesdrop on certain domestic conversations of United States citizens without first obtaining a court order, 289 contrary to FISA. 290 In other words, the executive department was evidently violating the law. Although Bush defended the practice as necessary to combat the War on Terror, done with congressional approval, 291 and authorized by his Article II powers, the argument is specious. Warrantless wiretapping in foreign intelligence cases would seem to be unnecessary; an "unforced error" as one commentator called it. 292 First, FISA allows emergency surveillance for up to seventy-two hours without a warrant. 293 Second, as indicated above, the statute requires only a showing of probable cause that foreign intelligence information is being sought, not probable cause that a crime has been committed as in the case of a conventional warrant. 294 Third, the FISA court has turned down only a handful among thousands of applications. 295 To circumvent the legislation set up for the purpose reveals arrogance and a belief in the irrelevance of Congress, and, whether legal or not, exposes the extent to which Americans are subject to electronic surveillance. If this were not enough, USA Today revealed in May of 2006 that the Government, through a program run by the NSA with the cooperation of AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth, has been collecting the phone call records of ten of millions of Americans. 296 NSA's reported goal is "to create a database of every call ever made" within the nation's borders, and although tracking terrorism is the avowed purpose of the program, with records of billions of domestic calls, the NSA has gained access to the communications habits of millions of Americans, most of whom are not suspected of committing any crime. For customers of the companies involved, the NSA has detailed records of both personal and business calls. Even though this may not be contrary to the Fourth Amendment, 297 it appears to violate at least the spirit, if not the letter, of federal law. As mentioned earlier, both Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act require a court order to acquire this information. 298 Again, the Bush administration apparently is violating the law.
New Pen Register and Trap-and-Trace Authority
A pen register records the outgoing numbers dialed from a particular telephone and a trap-and-trace device records incoming numbers. protection against the use of such law enforcement tools since one had no expectation of privacy in numbers dialed to and from a telephone. The Court held both that a person must know that the telephone company would have access to these numbers and that by voluntarily disclosing them to this third party all privacy expectations were lost.
300
Consequently, the Fourth Amendment imposed no warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion requirement for the installation of such devices on particular telephones. Congress responded in 1986, when Title III was amended, by supplying law enforcement with broad-based pen register and trap-and-trace authority requiring only that the government certify that the information was "relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."
301
The PATRIOT Act expands this power in two potentially ominous ways. First, § 216 requires 302 a judge on certification to "enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device anywhere within the United States . . . ." 303 Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the order was limited to "the jurisdiction of the court." 304 This suffers from all of the infirmities of the nationwide service of search warrants addressed earlier with an additional major difficulty. Before granting a search warrant, courts require that the warrant be supported by an affidavit establishing probable cause-whereas a pen register/trap-and-trace order requires only bare certification that the information sought is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The order can then be issued nationwide without any showing of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion. This is an extremely broad power to record the numbers dialed to and from telephones. The expanded power does not end there, however. The second major alteration of the 1986 law extends pen register/trap-and-trace authority to e-mail and Internet communications. Section 216 modifies the definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace device" to mean "a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information . . . ." 305 This would include, of course, e-mail addresses and Internet sites. Even though the statute excludes "the contents of any communication," 306 and irrespective of the debate of whether such uncoupling
